Bigger Than Watergate? Legitimate Concerns That Anti-Clinton Faction Within FBI May Have Conspired T


An Outline of What Increasingly Exhibits the Hallmarks of an Election Conspiracy

Unlike the effect of Russian interference on the 2016 presidential campaign, the effect—in votes—of the now-infamous “Comey Letter” is knowable.

While various media outlets downplayed the effect at the time, the hard data is unmistakable: according to a Politico/Morning Consult poll taken immediately after FBI Director Comey’s end-of-October announcement that the FBI would be reviewing additional evidence in the Clinton email-server case, one-third of likely voters reported that the revelation made them “much less likely” to vote for Clinton.

In an election Clinton lost by just 77,143 combined votes in three states—out of well over 136 million votes cast—this sort of polling data is one indication that Comey’s announcement could have cost Clinton millions of votes nationwide. But looking inside the Politico/Morning Consult data, we find much more evidence for that conclusion: specifically, the fact that while 26% of the poll’s 33% figure comes from Trump voters, the remaining 7% comes from those reporting to be Clinton voters.

Seven percent of the total electorate on November 8th was just under ten million voters (around 9,550,000 voters, to be exact).

Divided by state using voter distribution data, that’s an estimated (ceteris paribus) 206,100 voters in Wisconsin, where Trump won by less than 23,000 votes; 332,500 voters in Michigan, where Trump won by less than 11,000 votes; and 423,600 voters in Pennsylvania, where Trump won by less than 45,000 votes.

If even the smallest fraction of these “much less likely” Clinton voters were telling pollsters the truth about their intentions approximately a week before the election, their changed votes (or even their decision to abstain from voting) was more than enough to cost Clinton the election.

In Wisconsin, only an estimated 11.2% of newly disgruntled Clinton voters needed to be telling the truth about their new view of Clinton for their lost votes to have swung the state; in Michigan, that figure is 3.3%; in Pennsylvania, 10.6%. Professional pollsters can tell you what percentage of their data is reliable a week out from a general election—and it’s a much higher percentage than that. (And note that all of these figures measure the effect of a would-be Clinton voter deciding not to vote due to the Comey Letter; any prospective Clinton voters who voted for Trump instead of Clinton because of the reopening of the FBI investigation into Clinton’s email server of course count, if we reverse their decision, as a vote lost for Trump and one gained for Clinton. So the percentages above are likely high—indeed, as much as double the appropriate figures.)